We present a logical setting that incorporates a belief-revision mechanism within Dynamic-Epistemic logic. As the "static" basis for belief revision, we use epistemic plausibility models, together with a modal language based on two epistemic operators: a "knowledge" modality K (the standard S5, fully introspective, notion), and a "safe belief" modality 2 ("weak", non-negatively-introspective, notion, capturing a version of Lehrer's "indefeasible knowledge"). To deal with "dynamic" belief revision, we introduce action plausibility models, representing various types of "doxastic events". Action models "act" on state models via a modified update product operation: the "ActionPriority" Update. This is the natural dynamic generalization of AGM revision, giving priority to the incoming information (i.e. to "actions") over prior beliefs. We completely axiomatize this logic, and show how our update mechanism can "simulate", in a uniform manner, many different belief-revision policies.
Introduction
This paper contributes to the recent and on-going work in the logical community [2, 14, 23, 8, 10, 9, 7] on dealing with mechanisms for belief revision and update within the Dynamic-Epistemic Logic (DEL) paradigm. DEL originates in the work of Gerbrandy and Groeneveld [29, 28] , anticipated by Plaza in [43] , and further developed by numerous authors [6, 30, 21, 4, 22, 38, 5, 15, 16] etc. In its standard incarnation, as presented e.g. in the recent textbook [24] , the DEL approach is particularly well fit to deal with complex multi-agent learning actions by which groups of interactive agents update their beliefs (including higher-level beliefs about the others' beliefs), as long as the newly received information is consistent with the agents' prior beliefs. On the other hand, the classical AGM theory and its more recent extensions have been very successful in dealing with the problem of revising one-agent, first-level (factual) beliefs when they are contradicted by new information. So it is natural to look for a way to combine these approaches.
We develop here a notion of doxastic actions 1 , general enough to cover most examples of multi-agent communication actions encountered in the literature, but also flexible enough to deal with (both static and dynamic) belief revision, and in particular to implement various "belief-revision policies" in a unified setting. Our approach can be seen as a natural extension of the work in [5, 6] on "epistemic actions", incorporating ideas from the AGM theory along the lines pioneered in [2] and [23] , but using a qualitative approach based on conditional beliefs, in the line of [49, 20, 19, 14] .
Our paper assumes the general distinction, made in [23, 8, 14] , between "dynamic" and "static" belief revision. It is usually acknowledged that the classical AGM theory in [1, 27] (and embodied in our setting by the conditional belief operators B P a Q) is indeed "static", in the sense that it captures the agent's changing beliefs about an unchanging world. But in fact, when we take into account all the higher-level beliefs, the "world" (that these higher-level beliefs are about) includes all agent's (real) beliefs. 2 Thus, such a world is always changed by our changes of beliefs! So we can better understand a belief conditional on P as capturing the agent's beliefs after revising with P about the state of the world before the revision: the statement B P a Q says that, if agent a would learn P , then she would come to believe that Q was the case (before the learning). In contrast, "dynamic" belief revision uses dynamic modalities to capture the agent's revised beliefs about the world as it is after revision: [! P ]B a Q says that after learning P , agent a would come to believe that Q is the case (in the world after the learning). The standard alternative [36] to the AGM theory calls this belief update, but like the AGM approach, it only deals with "first-level" (factual) beliefs from a non-modal perspective, neglecting any higher-order "beliefs about beliefs". As a result, it completely misses the changes induced (in our own or the other agents' epistemic-doxastic states) by the learning actions themselves (e.g. the learning of a Moore sentence, see Section 3). This is reflected in the acceptance in [36] of the AGM "Success Axiom": in dynamic notation, this is the axiom [! P ]B a P (which cannot accommodate Moore sentences). Instead, the authors of [36] exclusively concentrate on the possible changes of (ontic) facts that may have occurred during our learning (but not due to our learning). In contrast, our approach to belief update (following the DEL tradition) may be thought of as "dual" to the one in [36] : we completely neglect here the ontic changes 3 , considering only the changes induced by "purely doxastic" actions (learning by observation, communication, etc.).
Our formalism for "static" revision can best be understood as a modallogic implementation of the well-known view of belief revision in terms of conditional reasoning [49, 51] . In [8] and [10] , we introduced two equivalent semantic settings for conditional beliefs in a multi-agent epistemic context (conditional doxastic models and epistemic plausibility models), taking the first setting as the basic one. Here, we adopt the second setting, which is closer to the standard semantic structures used in the literature on modeling belief revision [33, 48, 51, 26, 19, 14, 14, 17] . We use this setting to define notions of knowledge K a P , belief B a P and conditional belief B Q a P . Our concept of "knowledge" is the standard S5-notion, partition-based and fully introspective, that is commonly used in Computer Science and Economics, and is sometimes known as "Aumann knowledge", as a reference to [3] ). The conditional belief operator is a way to "internalize", in a sense, the "static" (AGM) belief revision within a modal framework: saying that, at state s, agent a believes P conditional on Q is a way of saying that Q belongs to a's revised "theory" (capturing her revised beliefs) after revision with P (of a's current theory/beliefs) at state s. Our conditional formulation of "static" belief revision is close to the one in [49, 46, 19, 20, 44] . As in [19] , the preference relation is assumed to be well-preordered; as a result, the logic CDL of conditional beliefs is equivalent to the strongest system in [19] .
We also consider other modalities, capturing other "doxastic attitudes" than just knowledge and conditional belief. The most important such notion expresses a form of "weak (non-introspective) knowledge" 2 a P , first introduced by Stalnaker in his modal formalization [49, 51] of Lehrer's defeasibility analysis of knowledge [39, 40] . We call this notion safe belief, to distinguish it from our (Aumann-type) concept of knowledge. Safe belief can be understood as belief that is persistent under revision with any true information. We use this notion to give a new solution to the so-called "Paradox of the Perfect Believer". We also solve the open problem posed in [19] , by providing a complete axiomatization of the "static" logic K2 of conditional belief, knowledge and safe belief. In a forthcoming paper, we apply the concept of safe belief to Game Theory, improving on Aumann's epistemic analysis of backwards induction in games of perfect information.
Moving thus on to dynamic belief revision, the first thing to note is that (unlike the case of "static" revision), the doxastic features of the actual "triggering event" that induced the belief change are essential for understanding this change (as a "dynamic revision", i.e. in terms of the revised beliefs about the state of the world after revision). For instance, our beliefs about the current situation after hearing a public announcement (say, of some factual information, denoted by an atomic sentence p) are different from our beliefs after receiving a fully private announcement with the same content p. Indeed, in the public case, we come to believe that p is now common knowledge (or at least common belief ). While, in the private case, we come to believe that the content of the announcement forms now our secret knowledge. So the agent's beliefs about the learning actions in which she is currently engaged affect the way she updates her previous beliefs.
This distinction is irrelevant for "static" revision, since e.g. in both cases above (public as well as private announcement) we learn the same thing about the situation that existed before the learning: our beliefs about that past situation will change in the same way in both cases. More generally, our beliefs about the "triggering action" are irrelevant, as far as our "static" revision is concerned. This explains a fact observed in [14] , namely that by and large, the standard literature on belief revision (or belief update) does not usually make explicit the doxastic events that "trigger" the belief change (dealing instead only with types of abstract operations on beliefs, such as update, revision and contraction etc). The reason for this lies in the "static" character of AGM revision, as well as its restriction (shared with the "updates" of [36] ) to one-agent, first-level, factual beliefs.
A "truly dynamic" logic of belief revision has to be able to capture the doxastic-epistemic features (e.g. publicity, complete privacy etc.) of specific "learning events". We need to be able to model the agents' "dynamic beliefs", i.e. their beliefs about the learning action itself : the appearance of this action (while it is happening) to each of the agents. In [5] , it was argued that a natural way to do this is to use the same type of formalism that was used to model "static" beliefs: epistemic actions should be modeled in essentially the same way as epistemic states; and this common setting was taken there to be given by epistemic Kripke models.
A similar move is made here in the context of our richer doxasticplausibility structures, by introducing plausibility pre-orders on actions and developing a notion of "action plausibility models", that extends the "epistemic action models" from [5] , along similar lines to (but without the quantitative features of) the work in [2, 23] .
Extending to (pre)ordered models the corresponding notion from [5] , we introduce an operation of product update of such models, based on the antilexicographic order on the product of the state model with the action model. The simplest and most natural way to define a connected pre-order on a Cartesian product from connected pre-orders on each of the components is to use either the lexicographic or the anti-lexicographic order. Our choice is the second, which we regard as the natural generalization of the AGM theory, giving priority to incoming information (i.e. to "actions" in our sense). This can also be thought of as a generalization of the so-called "maximal-Spohn" revision. We call this type of update rule the "Action-Priority" Update.
The intuition is that the beliefs encoded in the action model express the "incoming" changes of belief, while the state model only captures that past beliefs. One could say that the new "beliefs about actions" are acting on the prior "beliefs about states", producing the updated (posterior) beliefs. This is embedded in the Motto of Section 3.1: "beliefs about changes encode (and induce) changes of beliefs". By abstracting away from the quantitative details of the plausibility maps when considering the associated dynamic logic, our approach to dynamic belief revision is in the spirit of the one in [14] : instead of using "graded belief" operators as in e.g. [2, 23] , or probabilistic modal logic as in [38] , both our account and the one in [14] concentrate on the simple, qualitative language of conditional beliefs, knowledge and action modalities (to which we add here the safe belief operator). As a consequence, we obtain simple, elegant, general logical laws of dynamic belief revision, as natural generalizations of the ones in [14] . These "reduction laws" give a complete axiomatization of the logic of doxastic actions, "reducing" it to the "static" logic K2. Compared both to our older axiomatization in [10] and to the system in [2] , one can easily see that the introduction of the safe belief operator leads to a major simplification of the reduction laws.
Our qualitative logical setting (in this paper and in [8, 10, 9] ), as well as van Benthem's closely related setting in [14] , are conceptually very different from the more "quantitative" approaches to dynamic belief revision taken by Aucher, van Ditmarsch and Labuschagne [2, 23, 25] , approaches based on "degrees of belief" given by ordinal plausibility functions. This is not just a matter of interpretation, but it makes a difference for the choice of dynamic revision operators. Indeed, the update mechanisms proposed in [48, 2, 23] are essentially quantitative, using various binary functions in transfinite ordinal arithmetic, in order to compute the degree of belief of the output-states in terms of the degrees of the input-states and the degrees of the actions. This leads to an increase in complexity, both in the computation of updates and in the corresponding logical systems. Moreover, there seems to be no canonical choice for the arithmetical formula for updates, various authors proposing various formulas. No clear intuitive justification is provided to any of these formulas, and we see no transparent reason to prefer one to the others. In contrast, classical (AGM) belief revision theory is a qualitative theory, based on natural, intuitive postulates, of great generality and simplicity.
Our approach retains this qualitative flavor of the AGM theory, and aims to build a theory of "dynamic" belief revision of equal simplicity and naturality as the classical "static" account. Moreover (unlike the AGM theory), it aims to provide a "canonical" choice for a dynamic revision operator, given by our "Action Priority" update. This notion is a purely qualitative one 4 , based on a simple, natural relational definition. From a formal point of view, one might see our choice of the anti-lexicographic order as just one of the many possible options for developing a belief-revisionfriendly notion of update. As already mentioned, it is a generalization of the "maximal-Spohn" revision, already explored in [23] and [2] , among many other possible formulas for combining the "degrees of belief" of actions and states. But here we justify our option, arguing that our qualitative interpretation of the plausibility order makes this the only reasonable choice.
It may seem that by making this choice, we have confined ourselves to only one of the bewildering multitude of "belief revision policies" proposed in the literature [48, 44, 47, 2, 23, 17, 14] . But, as argued below, this apparent limitation is not so limiting after all, but can instead be regarded as an advantage: the power of the "action model" approach is reflected in the fact that many different belief revision policies can be recovered as instances of the same type of update operation. In this sense, our approach can be seen as a change of perspective: the diversity of possible revision policies is replaced by the diversity of possible action models; the differences are now viewed as differences in input, rather than having different "programs". For a computer scientist, this resembles "Currying" in lambda-calculus: if every "operation" is encoded as an input-term, then one operation (functional application) can simulate all operations. 5 In a sense, this is nothing but the idea of Turing's universal machine, which underlies universal computation.
The title of our paper is a paraphrase of Oliver Board's "Dynamic Interactive Epistemology" [19] , itself a paraphrase of the title ("Interactive Epistemology") of a famous paper by Aumann [3] . We interpret the word "interactive" as referring to the multiplicity of agents and the possibility 4 One could argue that our plausibility pre-order relation is equivalent to a quantitative notion (of ordinal degrees of plausibility, such as [48] ), but unlike in [2, 23] the way belief update is defined in our account does not make any use of the ordinal "arithmetic" of these degrees. 5 Note that, as in untyped lambda-calculus, the input-term encoding the operation (i.e. our "action model") and the "static" input-term to be operated upon (i.e. the "state model") are essentially of the same type: epistemic plausibility models for the same language (and for the same set of agents).
of communication.
Observe that "interactive" does not necessarily imply "dynamic": indeed, Board and Stalnaker consider Aumann's notion to be "static" (since it doesn't accommodate any non-trivial belief revision). But even Board's logic, as well as Stalnaker's [51] , are "static" in our sense: they cannot directly capture the effect of learning actions (but can only express "static" conditional beliefs). In contrast, our DEL-based approach has all the "dynamic" features and advantages of DEL: in addition to "simulating" a range of individual belief-revision policies, it can deal with an even wider range of complex types of multi-agent learning and communication actions. We thus think it is realistic to expect that, within its own natural limits 6 , our Action-Priority Update Rule could play the role of a "universal machine" for qualitative dynamic interactive belief-revision.
"Static" Belief Revision
Using the terminology in [14, 8, 10, 9, 11] , "static" belief revision is about pre-enconding potential belief revisions as conditional beliefs. A conditional belief statement B P a Q can be thought of as expressing a "doxastic predisposition" or a "plan of doxastic action": the agent is determined to believe that Q was the case, if he learnt that P was the case. The semantics for conditional beliefs is usually given in terms of plausibility models (or equivalent notions, e,g. "spheres", "onions", ordinal functions etc.) As we shall see, both (Aumann, S5-like) knowledge and simple (unconditional) belief can be defined in terms of conditional belief, which itself could be defined in terms of a unary belief-revision operator : * a P captures all the revised beliefs of agent a after revising (her current beliefs) with P .
In addition, we introduce a safe belief operator 2 a P , meant to express a weak notion of "defeasible knowledge" (obeying the laws of the modal logic S4.3). This concept was defined in [51, 19] using a higher-order semantics (quantifying over conditional beliefs). But this is in fact equivalent to a first-order definition, as the Kripke modality for the (converse) plausibility relation. This observation greatly simplifies the task of completely axiomatizing the logic of safe belief and conditional beliefs: indeed, our proof system K2 below is a solution to the open problem posed in [19] .
Plausibility Models: the single agent case
To warm up, we consider first the case of only one agent, case which fits well with the standard models for belief revision.
A single-agent plausibility frame is a structure (S, ≤), consisting of a set S of "states" and a "well-preorder" ≤, i.e. a reflexive, transitive binary relation on S such that every non-empty subset has minimal elements. Using the notation Min ≤ P := {s ∈ P : s ≤ s for all s ∈ P } for the set of ≤-minimal elements of P , the last condition says that: for every set P ⊆ S, if P = ∅ then Min ≤ P = ∅.
The usual reading of s ≤ t is that "state s is at least as plausible as state t". We keep this reading for now, though we will later get back to it and clarify its meaning. The "minimal states" in Min ≤ P are thus the "most plausible states" satisfying proposition P . As usually, we write s < t iff s ≤ t but t ≤ s, for the "strict" plausibility relation (s is more plausible than t). Similarly, we write s ∼ = t iff both s ≤ t and t ≤ s, for the "equiplausibility" (or indifference) relation (s and t are equally plausible).
S-propositions and Models. Given an epistemic plausibility frame S, an S-proposition is any subset P ⊆ S. Intuitively, we say that a state s satisfies the proposition P if s ∈ P . Observe that a plausibility frame is just a special case of a relational frame (or Kripke frame). So, as it is standard for Kripke frames in general, we can define a plausibility model to be a structure S = (S, ≤, · ), consisting of a plausibility frame (S, ≤) together with a valuation map · : Φ → P(S), mapping every element of a given set Φ of "atomic sentences" into S-propositions.
Interpretation. The elements of S will represent the possible states (or "possible worlds") of a system. The atomic sentences p ∈ Φ represent "ontic" (non-doxastic) facts, that might hold or not in a given state. The valuation tells us which facts hold at which worlds. Finally, the plausibility relations ≤ capture the agent's (conditional) beliefs about the state of the system ; if e.g. the agent was given the information that the state of the system is either s or t, she would believe that the system was in the most plausible of the two. So, if s < t, the agent would believe the real state was s; if t < s, she would believe it was t; otherwise (if s ∼ = t), the agent would be indifferent between the two alternatives: she will not be able to decide to believe any one alternative rather than the other.
Propositional Operators, Kripke Modalities. For every model S, we have the usual Boolean operations with S-propositions P ∧ Q := P ∩ Q, P ∨ Q := P ∪ Q, ¬P := S \ P, P → Q := ¬P ∨ Q, as well as Boolean constants S := S and ⊥ S := ∅. Obviously, one also introduce infinitary conjunctions and disjunctions. In addition, any binary relation R ⊆ S × S on S gives rise to a Kripke modality [R] : P(S) → P(S), defined by
[R]Q := {s ∈ S : ∀t (sRt ⇒ t ∈ Q)}.
Accessibility Relations for Belief, Conditional Belief and Knowledge. To talk about beliefs, we introduce a doxastic accessibility relation →, given by s → t iff t ∈ Min ≤ S .
We read this as saying that: when the actual state is s, the agent believes that any of the states t with s → t may be the actual state. This matches the above interpretation of the preorder: the states believed to be possible are the minimal (i,e. "most plausible") ones.
In order to talk about conditional beliefs, we can similarly define a conditional doxastic accessibility relation for each S-proposition P ⊆ S:
We read this as saying that: when the actual state is s, if the agent is given the information (that) P (is true at the actual state), then she believes that any of the states t with s → t may be the actual state. Finally, to talk about knowledge, we introduce a relation of epistemic possibility (or "indistinguishability") ∼. Essentially, this is just the universal relation:
s ∼ t iff s, t ∈ S .
So, in single-agent models, all the states in S are assumed to be "epistemically possible": the only thing known with absolute certainty about the current state is that it belongs to S. This is natural, in the context of a single agent: the states known to be impossible are irrelevant from the point of doxastic-epistemic logic, so they can simply be excluded from our model S. (As seen below, this cannot be done in the case of multiple agents!)
Knowledge and (Conditional) Belief. We define knowledge and (conditional) belief as the Kripke modalities for the epistemic and (conditional) doxastic accessibility relations:
We read KP as saying that the (implicit) agent knows P . This is "knowledge" in the strong Leibnizian sense of "truth in all possible worlds". We similarly read BP as "P is believed" and B Q P as "P is believed given (or conditional on) Q ". As for conditional belief statements s ∈ B Q P , we interpret them in the following way: if the actual state is s, then after coming to believe that Q is the case (at this actual state), the agent will believe that P was the case (at the same actual state, before his change of belief). In other words, conditional beliefs B Q give descriptions of the agent's plan (or commitments) about what he will believe about the current state after receiving new (believable) information. To quote Johan van Benthem in [14] , conditional beliefs are "static pre-encodings" of the agent's potential belief changes in the face of new information.
Discussion on Interpretation. Observe that our interpretation of the plausibility relations is qualitative, in terms of conditional beliefs rather than "degrees of belief": there is no scale of beliefs here, allowing for "intermediary" stages between believing and not believing. Instead, all these beliefs are equally "firm" (though conditional ): given the condition, something is either believed or not. To repeat, writing s < t is for us just a way to say that: if given the information that the state of the system is either s or t, the agent would believe it to be s. So plausibility relations are special cases of conditional belief. This interpretation is based on the following (easily verifiable) equivalence:
There is nothing quantitative here, no need for us to refer in any way to the "strength" of this agent's belief: though she might have beliefs of unequal strengths, we are not interested here in modeling this quantitative aspect. Instead, we give the agent some information about a state of a virtual system (that it is either s or t) and we ask her a yes-or-no question ("Do you believe that virtual state to be s ?"); we write s < t iff the agent's answer is "yes". This is a firm answer, so it expresses a firm belief. "Firm" does not imply "un-revisable" though: if later we reveal to the agent that the state in question was in fact t, she should be able to accept this new information; after all, the agent should be introspective enough to realize that her belief, however firm, was just a belief.
One possible objection against this qualitative interpretation is that our postulate that ≤ is a well-preorder (and so in particular a connected preorder) introduces a hidden "quantitative" feature; indeed, any such preorder can be equivalently described using a plausibility map as in e.g. [48] , assigning ordinals to states. Our answer is that, first, the specific ordinals will not play any role in our definition of a dynamic belief update; and second, all our postulates can be given a justification in purely qualitative terms, using conditional beliefs. The transitivity condition for ≤ is just a consistency requirement imposed on a rational agent's conditional beliefs. And the existence of minimal elements in any non-empty subset is simply the natural extension of the above setting to general conditional beliefs, not only conditions involving two states: more specifically, for any possible condition P ⊆ S about a system S, the S-proposition Min ≤ P is simply a way to encode everything that the agent would believe about the current state of the system, if she was given the information that the state satisfied condition P .
Note on Other Models in the Literature. Our models are the same as Board's "belief revision structures" [19] , i.e. nothing but "Spohn models" as in [48] , but with a purely relational description. Spohn models are usually described in terms of a map assigning ordinals to states. But giving such a map is equivalent to introducing a well pre-order ≤ on states, and it is easy to see that all the relevant information is captured by this order.
Our conditions on the preorder ≤ can also be seen as a semantical analogue of Grove's conditions for the (relational version of) his models in [33] . The standard formulation of Grove models is in terms of a "system of spheres" (weakening Lewis' similar notion), but it is equivalent (as proved in [33] ) to a relational formulation. Grove's postulates are still syntaxdependent, e.g. existence of minimal elements is required only for subsets that are definable in his language: this is the so-called "smoothness" condition, which is weaker than our "well-preordered" condition. We prefer a purely semantic condition, independent of the choice of a language, both for reasons of elegance and simplicity and because we want to be able to consider more than one language for the same structure.
7 So, following [19, 51] and others, we adopt the natural semantic analogue of Grove's condition, simply requiring that every subset has minimal elements: this will allow our conditional operators to be well-defined on sentences of any extension of our logical language.
Note that the minimality condition implies, by itself, that the relation ≤ is both reflexive (i.e. s ≤ s for all s ∈ S) and connected 8 (i.e. either s ≤ t or t ≤ s, for all s, t ∈ S). In fact, a "well-preorder" is the same as a connected, transitive, well-founded 9 relation, which is the setting proposed in [19] for a logic of conditional beliefs equivalent to our logic CDL below. Note also that, when the set S is finite, a well-preorder is nothing but a connected preorder. This shows that our notion of frame subsumes, not only Grove's setting, but also some of the other settings proposed for conditionalization.
7 Imposing syntactic-dependent conditions in the very definition of a class of structures makes the definition meaningful only for one language; or else, the meaning of what, say, a plausibility model is won't be robust: it will change whenever one wants to extend the logic, by adding a few more operators. This is very undesirable, since then one cannot compare the expressivity of different logics on the same class of models. 8 In the Economics literature, connectedness is called "completeness", see e.g. [19] . 9 I.e. there exists no infinite descending chain s 0 > s 1 > · · · .
Multi-Agent Plausibility Models
In the multi-agent case, we cannot exclude from the model the states that are known to be impossible by some agent a: they may still be considered possible by a second agent b. Moreover, they might still be relevant for a's beliefs/knowledge about what b believes or knows. So, in order to define an agent's knowledge, we cannot simply quantify over all states, as we did above: instead, we need to consider, as usually done in the Kripke-model semantics of knowledge, only the "possible" states, i.e. the ones that are indistinguishable from the real state, as far as a given agent is concerned. It is thus natural, in the multi-agent context, to explicitly specify the agents' epistemic indistinguishability relations ∼ a (labeled with the agents' names) as part of the basic structure, in addition to the plausibility relations ≤ a . Taking this natural step, we obtain epistemic plausibility frames (S, ∼ a , ≤ a ). As in the case of a single agent, specifying epistemic relations turns out to be superfluous: the relations ∼ a can be recovered from the relations ≤ a . Hence, we will simplify the above structures, obtaining the equivalent setting of multi-agent plausibility frames (S, ≤ a ).
Before going on to define these notions, observe that it doesn't make sense anymore to require the plausibility relations ≤ a to be connected (and even less sense to require them to be well-preordered): if two states s, t are distinguishable by an agent a, i.e. s ∼ a t, then a will never consider both of them as epistemically possible in the same time. If she was given the information that the real state is either s or t, agent a will immediately know which of the two: if the real state was s, she would be able to distinguish this state from t, and would thus know the state was s; similarly, if the real state was t, she would know it to be t. Her beliefs will play no role in this, and it would be meaningless to ask her which of the two states is more plausible to her. So only the states in the same ∼ a -equivalence class could, and should, be ≤ a -comparable; i.e. s ≤ a t implies s ∼ a t, and the restriction of ≤ a to each ∼ a -equivalence class is connected. Extending the same argument to arbitrary conditional beliefs, we can see that the restriction of ≤ a to each ∼ a -equivalence class must be well-preordered.
Epistemic Plausibility Frames. Let A be a finite set of labels, called agents. A epistemic plausibility frame over A (EPF, for short) is a structure S = (S, ∼ a , ≤ a ) a∈A , consisting of a set S of "states", endowed with a family of equivalence relations ∼ a , called epistemic indistinguishability relations, and a family of plausibility relations ≤ a , both labeled by "agents" and assumed to satisfy two conditions: (1) ≤ a -comparable states are ∼ aindistinguishable (i.e. s ≤ a t implies s ∼ a t); (2) the restriction of each plausibility relation ≤ a to each ∼ a -equivalence class is a well-preorder. As before, we use the notation Min ≤a P for the set of ≤ a -minimal elements of P . We write s < a t iff s ≤ a t but t ≤ a s (the "strict" plausibility relation), and write s ∼ =a t iff both s ≤ a t and t ≤ a s (the "equi-plausibility" relation). The notion of epistemic plausibility models (EPM, for short) is defined in the same way as the plausibility models in the previous section.
Epistemic Plausibility Models. We define a (multi-agent) epistemic plausibility model (EPM, for short) as a multi-agent EPF together with a valuation over it (the same way that single-agent plausibility models were defined in the previous section).
It is easy to see that our definition of EPFs includes superfluous information: in an EPF, the knowledge relation ∼ a can be recovered from the plausibility relation ≤ a , via the following rule:
In other words, two states are indistinguishable for a iff they are comparable (with respect to ≤ a ).
So, in fact, one could present epistemic plausibility frames simply as multi-agent plausibility frames. To give this alternative presentation, we use, for any preorder relation ≤, the notation ∼ for the associated comparability relation
(where ≥ is the converse of ≤). A comparability class is a set of the form {t : s ≤ t or t ≤ s}, for some state s. A relation ≤ is called locally wellpreordered if it is a preorder such that its restriction to each comparability class is well-preordered. Note that, when the underlying set S is finite, a locally well-preordered relation is nothing but a locally connected preorder : a preorder whose restrictions to any comparability class are connected. More generally, a locally well-preordered relation is the same as a locally connected and well-founded preorder.
Multi-agent Plausibility Frames. A multi-agent plausibility frame (MPF, for short) is a structure (S, ≤ a ) a∈A , consisting of a set of states S together with a family of locally well-preordered relations ≤ a , one for each agent a ∈ A. Oliver Board [19] calls multi-agent plausibility frames "belief revision structures". A multi-agent plausibility model (MPM, for short) is an MPF together with a valuation map.
Bijective Correspondence Between EPFs and MPFs. Every MPF can be canonically mapped into an EPF, obtained by defining epistemic indistinguishability via the above rule (∼ a := ≤ a ∪ ≥ a ). Conversely, every EPF gives rise to an MPF, via the map that "forgets" the indistinguishability structure. It is easy to see that these two maps are the inverse of each other. Consequently, from now on we identify MPFs and EPFs, and similarly identify MPMs and EPMs; e.g. we can talk about "knowledge", "(conditional) belief" etc. in an MPM, defined in terms of the associated EPM.
So from now on we identify the two classes of models, via the above canonical bijection, and talk about "plausibility models" in general. One can also see how this approach relates to another widely adopted definition for conditional beliefs; in [19] , [23] , [14] , this definition involves the assumption of a "local plausibility" relation at a given state s ≤ w a t, to be read as: "at state w, agent a considers state s at least as plausible as state t ". Given such a relation, the conditional belief operator is usually defined in terms that are equivalent to putting s → P a t iff t ∈ Min ≤ s a P . One could easily restate our above definition in this form, by taking:
The converse problem is studied in [19] , where it is shown that, if full introspection is assumed, then one can recover "uniform" plausibility relations ≤ a from the relations ≤ w a .
Information Cell. The equivalence relation ∼ a induces a partition of the state space S, called agent a's information partition. We denote by s(a) the information cell of s in a's partition, i.e. the ∼ a -equivalence class of s:
The information cell s(a) captures all the knowledge possessed by the agent at state s: when the actual state of the system is s, then agent a knows only the state's equivalence class s(a).
Example 2.1. Alice and Bob play a game, in which an anonymous referee puts a coin on the table, lying face up but in such a way that the face is covered (so Alice and Bob cannot see it). Based on previous experience, (it is common knowledge that) Alice and Bob believe that the upper face is Heads (since e.g. they noticed that the referee had a strong preference for Heads). And in fact, they're right: the coin lies Heads up. Neglecting the anonymous referee, the EPM for this example is the following model S:
Here, the arrows represent converse plausibility relations ≥ between distinct states only (going from less plausible to more plausible states): since these are always reflexive, we choose to skip all the loops for convenience. The squares represent the information cells for the two agents. Instead of labels, we use dashed arrows and squares for Alice, while using continuous arrows and squares for Bob. In this picture, the actual state of the system is the state s on the left (in which H is true). Henceforth, in our other examples, we will refer to this particular plausibility model as S.
By deleting the squares, we obtain a representation of the corresponding MPM, also denoted by S (where we now use labels for agents instead of different types of lines):
In front of Alice, the referee shows the face of the coin to Bob, but Alice cannot see the face. The EPM is now the following model W:
Since Bob now knows the state of the coin, his local plausibility relation consists only of loops, and hence we have no arrows for Bob in this diagrammatic representation.
(Conditional) Doxastic Appearance and (Conditional) Doxastic Accessibility. As in the previous section, we can define a doxastic and epistemic accessibility relations, except that now we have to select, for each state s, the most plausible states in its information cell s(a) (instead of the most plausible in S). For this, it is convenient to introduce some notation and terminology: the doxastic appearance of state s to agent a is the set
of the "most plausible" states that are consistent with the agent's knowledge at state s. The doxastic appearance of s captures the way state s appears to the agent, or (in the language of Belief Revision) the agent's current "theory" about the world s. We can extend this to capture conditional beliefs (in full generality), by associating to each S -proposition P ⊆ S and each state s ∈ S the conditional doxastic appearance s P a of state s to agent a, given (information) P . This can be defined as the S-proposition s P a := Min ≤a s(a) ∩ P given by the set of all ≤ a -minimal states of s(a) ∩ P : these are the "most plausible" states satisfying P that are consistent with the agent's knowledge at state s. The conditional appearance S P a gives the agent's revised theory (after learning P ) about the world s. We can put these in a relational form, by defining doxastic accessibility relations → a , → P a , as follows:
Knowledge and (Conditional) Belief. As before, we define the knowledge and (conditional) belief operators for an agent a as the Kripke modalities for a's epistemic and (conditional) doxastic accessibility relations:
We also need a notation for the dual of the K modality ("epistemic possibility"):K a P := ¬K a ¬P. Doxastic Propositions. Until now, our notion of proposition is "local", being specific to a given model: we only have "S-propositions" for each model S. As long as the model is fixed, this notion is enough for interpreting sentences over the given model. But, since later we will proceed to study systematic changes of models (when dealing with dynamic belief revision), we need a notion of proposition that is not confined to one model, but makes sense on all models:
A doxastic proposition is a map P assigning to each plausibility model S some S-proposition P S ⊆ S. We write s |= S P, and say that the proposition P is true at s ∈ S, iff s ∈ (P) S . We skip the subscript and write s |= P when the model is understood.
We denote by Prop the family of all doxastic propositions. All the Boolean operations on S-propositions as sets can be lifted pointwise to operations on Prop: in particular, we have the "always true"
and "always false" ⊥ propositions, given by (⊥) S := ∅, ( ) S := S, negation (¬P) S := S \ P S , conjunction (P ∧ Q) S := P S ∩ Q S , disjunction (P ∨ Q) S := P S ∪ Q S and all the other standard Boolean operators, including infinitary conjunctions and disjunctions. Similarly, we can define pointwise the epistemic and (conditional) doxastic modalities:
It is easy to check that we have: B a P = B a P. Finally, the relation of entailment P |= Q between doxastic propositions is given pointwise by inclusion: P |= Q iff P S ⊆ Q S for all S.
Safe Belief and the Defeasibility Theory of Knowledge
Ever since Plato's identification of knowledge with "true justified (or justifiable) belief" was shattered by Gettier's celebrated counterexamples [31] , philosophers have been looking for the "missing ingredient" in the Platonic equation. Various authors identify this missing ingredient as "robustness" (Hintikka [34] ), "indefeasibility" (Klein [37] , Lehrer [39] , Lehrer and Paxson [40] , Stalnaker [51] ) or "stability" (Rott [45] ). According to this defeasibility theory of knowledge (or "stability theory", as formulated by Rott), a belief counts as "knowledge" if it is stable under belief revision with any new evidence: "if a person has knowledge, than that person's justification must be sufficiently strong that it is not capable of being defeated by evidence that he does not possess" (Pappas and Swain [42] ).
One of the problems is interpreting what "evidence" means in this context. There are at least two natural interpretations, each giving us a concept of "knowledge". The first, and the most common 10 , interpretation is to take it as meaning "any true information". The resulting notion of "knowledge" was formalized by Stalnaker in [51] , and defined there as follows: "an agent knows that ϕ if and only if ϕ is true, she believes that ϕ, and she continues to believe ϕ if any true information is received". This concept differs from the usual notion of knowledge ("Aumannn knowledge") in Computer Science and Economics, by the fact that it does not satisfy the laws of the modal system S5 (in fact, negative introspection fails); Stalnaker shows that the complete modal logic of this modality is the modal system S4.3. As we'll see, this notion ("Stalnaker knowledge") corresponds to what we call "safe belief" 2P . On the other hand, another natural interpretation, considered by at least one author [45] , takes "evidence" to mean "any proposition", i.e. to include possible misinformation: "real knowledge" should be robust even in the face of false evidence. As shown below, this corresponds to our "knowledge" modality KP , which could be called "absolutely unrevisable belief". This is a partition-based concept of knowledge, identifiable with "Aumann knowledge" and satisfying all the laws of S5. In other words, this last interpretation provides a perfectly decent "defeasibility" defense of S5 and of negative introspection! In this paper, we adopt the pragmatic point of view of the formal logician: instead of debating which of the two types of "knowledge" is the real one, we simply formalize both notions in a common setting, compare them, axiomatize the logic obtained by combining them and use their joint strength to express interesting properties. Indeed, as shown below, conditional beliefs can be defined in terms of knowledge only if we combine both the above-mentioned types of "knowledge".
Knowledge as Unrevisable Belief. Observe that, for all propositions P, we have
(where the conjunction ranges over all doxastic propositions), or equivalently, we have for every state s in every model S:
This gives a characterization of knowledge as "absolute" belief, invariant under any belief revision: a given belief is "known" iff it cannot be revised, i.e. it would be still believed in any condition.
11 Observe that this resembles the defeasibility analysis of knowledge, but only if we adopt the second interpretation mentioned above (taking "evidence" to include misinformation). Thus, our "knowledge" is more robust than Stalnaker's: it resists any belief revision, not capable of being defeated by any evidence (including false evidence). This is a very "strong" notion of knowledge (implying "absolute certainty" and full introspection), which seems to us to fit better with the standard usage of the term in Computer Science literature. Also, unlike the one in [51] , our notion of knowledge is negatively introspective.
Another identity 12 that can be easily checked is:
(where ⊥ is the "always false" proposition). This captures in a different way the "absolute un-revisability" of knowledge: something is "known" if it is believed even if conditionalizing our belief with its negation. In other words, this simply expresses the impossibility of accepting its negation as evidence (since such a revision would lead to an inconsistent belief).
Safe Belief. To capture "Stalnaker knowledge", we introduce the Kripke modality 2 a associated to the converse ≥ a of the plausibility relation, going from any state s to all the states that are "at least as plausible" as s. For S-propositions P ⊆ S over any given model S, we put 2 a P := [≥ a ]P = {s ∈ S : t ∈ P for all t ≤ a s}, 11 This of course assumes agents to be "rational" in a sense that excludes "fundamentalist" or "dogmatic" beliefs, i.e. beliefs in unknown propositions but refusing any revision, even when contradicted by facts. But this "rationality" assumption is already built in our plausibility models, which satisfy an epistemically friendly version of the standard AGM postulates of rational belief revision. See [8] for details. 12 This identity corresponds to the definition of "necessity" in [49] in terms of doxastic conditionals.
and this induces pointwise an operator 2 a P on doxastic propositions. We read s |= 2 a P as saying that: at state s, agent a's belief in P is safe; or at state s, a safely believes that P. We will explain this reading below, but first observe that: 2 a is an S4-modality (since ≥ a is reflexive and transitive), but not necessarily S5; i.e. safe beliefs are truthful (2 a P |= P) and positively introspective (2 a P |= 2 a 2 a P), but not necessarily negatively introspective: in general, ¬2 a P |= 2 a ¬2 a P.
Relations Between Knowledge, Safe Belief and Conditional Belief. First, knowledge entails safe belief
and safe belief entails belief
The last observation can be strengthened to characterize safe belief in a similar way to the above characterization (1) We can thus see that safe belief coincides indeed with Stalnaker's notion of "knowledge", given by the first interpretation ("evidence as true information") of the defeasibility theory. As mentioned above, we prefer to keep the name "knowledge" for the strong notion (which gives absolute certainty), and call this weaker notion "safe belief": indeed, these are beliefs that are "safe" to hold, in the sense that no future learning of truthful information will force us to revise them.
Example 2.3 (Dangerous Knowledge
). This starts with the situation in Example 2.1 (when none of the two agents has yet seen the face of the coin). Alice has to get out of the room for a minute, which creates an opportunity for Bob to quickly raise the cover in her absence and take a peek at the coin. He does that, and so he sees that the coin is Heads up. After Alice returns, she obviously doesn't know whether or not Bob took a peek at the coin, but she believes he didn't do it: taking a peek is against the rules of the game, and so she trusts Bob not to do that. The model is now rather complicated, so we only represent the MPM:
Let us call this model S . The actual state s 1 is the one in the upper left corner, in which Bob took a peek and saw the coin Heads up, while the state t 1 in the upper right corner represents the other possibility, in which Bob saw the coin lying Tails up. The two lower states s 2 and t 2 represent the case in which Bob didn't take a peek. Observe that the above drawing includes the (natural) assumption that Alice keeps her previous belief that the coin lies Heads up (since there is no reason for her to change her mind). Moreover, we assumed that she will keep this belief even if she'd be told that Bob took a peek: this is captured by the a-arrow from t 1 to s 1 . This seems natural: Bob's taking a peek doesn't change the upper face of the coin, so it shouldn't affect Alice's prior belief about the coin.
In both Examples 2.1 and 2.3 above, Alice holds a true belief (at the real state) that the coin lies Heads up: the actual state satisfies B a H. In both cases, this true belief is not knowledge (since Alice doesn't know the upper face), but nevertheless in Example 2.1, this belief is safe (although it is not known by the agent to be safe): no additional truthful information (about the real state s) can force her to revise this belief. (To see this, observe that any new truthful information would reveal to Alice the real state s, thus confirming her belief that Heads is up.) So in the model S from Example 2.1, we have s |= 2 a H (where s is the actual state). In contrast, in Example 2.2, Alice's belief (that the coin is Heads up), though true, is not safe. There is some piece of correct information (about the real state s 1 ) which, if learned by Alice, would make her change this belief: we can represent this piece of correct information as the doxastic proposition H → K b H. It is easy to see that the actual state s 1 of the model S satisfies the proposition B H→K b H a T (since (H → K b H) S = {s 1 , t 1 , t 2 } and the minimal state in the set s 1 (a) ∩ {s 1 , s 1 , t 2 } = {s 1 , t 1 , t 2 } is t 2 , which satisfies T.) So, if given this information, Alice would come to wrongly believe that the coin is Tails up! This is an example of a dangerous truth: a true information whose learning can lead to wrong beliefs.
Observe that an agent's belief can be safe without him necessarily knowing this (in the "strong" sense of knowledge given by K): "safety" (similarly to "truth") is an external property of the agent's beliefs, that can be ascertained only by comparing his belief-revision system with reality. Indeed, the only way for an agent to know a belief to be safe is to actually know it to be truthful, i.e. to have actual knowledge (not just a belief) of its truth. This is captured by the valid identity
(1.4)
In other words: knowing that something is safe to believe is the same as just knowing it to be true. In fact, all beliefs held by an agent "appear safe" to him: in order to believe them, he has to believe that they are safe. This is expressed by the valid identity
saying that: believing that something is safe to believe is the same as just believing it. Contrast this with the situation concerning "knowledge": in our logic (as in most standard doxastic-epistemic logics), we have the identity
So believing that something is known is the same as knowing it!
The Puzzle of the Perfect Believer. The last identity is well-known and has been considered "paradoxical" by many authors. In fact, the socalled "Paradox of the Perfect Believer" in [32, 52, 35, 41, 53, 26] is based on it. For a "strong" notion of belief as the one we have here ("belief" = belief with certainty), it seems reasonable to assume the following "axiom":
Putting this together with (6) above, we get a paradoxical conclusion:
So this leads to a triviality result: knowledge and belief collapse to the same thing, and all beliefs are always true! One solution to the "paradox" is to reject (?), as an (intuitive but) wrong "axiom". In contrast, various authors [52, 35, 26, 53] accept (?) and propose other solutions, e.g. giving up the principle of "negative introspection" for knowledge. Our solution to the paradox, as embodied in the contrasting identities (1.5) and (1.6), combines the advantages of both solutions above: the "axiom" (?) is correct if we interpret "knowledge" as safe belief 2 a , since then (?) becomes equivalent to identity (1.5) above; but then negative introspection fails for this interpretation! On the other hand, if we interpret "knowledge" as our K a -modality then negative introspection holds; but then the above "axiom" (?) fails, and on the contrary we have the identity (1.6).
So, in our view, the paradox of the perfect believer arises from the conflation of two different notions of "knowledge": "Aumann" (partition-based) knowledge and "Stalnaker" knowledge (i.e. safe belief).
(Conditional) Beliefs in Terms of "Knowledge" Notions. An important observation is that one can characterize/define (conditional) beliefs only in terms of our two "knowledge" concepts (K and 2): for simple beliefs, we have B a P =K a 2 a P = 3 a 2 a P , where recall thatK a P = ¬K a ¬P is the Diamond modality for K a , and 3 a P = ¬2 a ¬P is the Diamond for 2 a . The equivalence B a P = 3 a 2 a P has recently been observed by Stalnaker in [51] , who took it as the basis of a philosophical analysis of "belief" in terms of "defeasible knowledge" (i.e. safe belief). Unfortunately, this analysis does not apply to conditional belief: one can easily see that conditional belief cannot be defined in terms of safe belief only! However, one can generalize the identity B a P =K a 2 a P above, defining conditional belief in terms of both our "knowledge" concepts:
Other modalities and doxastic attitudes
From a modal logic perspective, it is natural to introduce the Kripke modalities [> a ] and [ ∼ =a] for the other important relations (strict plausibility and equiplausibility): for S-propositions P ⊆ S over a given model S, we put [> a ]P := {s ∈ S : t ∈ P for all t < a s}, [ ∼ =a]P := {s ∈ S : t ∈ P for all t ∼ =a s}, and as before these pointwise induce corresponding operators on Prop. The intuitive meaning of these operators is not very clear, but they can be used to define other interesting modalities, capturing various "doxastic attitudes".
Weakly Safe Belief. We can define a weakly safe belief operator 2 weak P in terms of the strict order by putting:
Clearly, this gives us the following truth clause s |= 2 weak a P iff: s |= P and t |= P for all t < s .
But a more useful characterization is the following:
s |= 2 weak a Q iff: s |= ¬B P a ¬Q for every P such that s |= P . So "weakly safe beliefs" are beliefs which (might be lost but) are never reversed (into believing the opposite) when revising with any true information.
The Unary Revision Operator. Using the strict plausibility modality, we can also define a unary "belief revision" modality * a , which in some sense internalizes the standard (binary) belief revision operator, by putting:
This gives us the following truth clause:
It is easy to see that * a P selects from any given information cell s(a) precisely those states that satisfy agent a's revised theory s P a : * a P ∩ s(a) = s
P a
Recall that s P a = Min ≤a s(a) ∩ P is the conditional appearance of s to a given P , representing the agent's "revised theory" (after revision with P ) about s. This explains our interpretation: the proposition * a P is a complete description of the agent's P -revised "theory" about the current state.
Another interesting identity is the following:
In other words: Q is a conditional belief (given a condition P) iff it is a known consequence of the agent's revised theory (after revision with P).
Degrees of Belief. Spohn's "degrees of belief" [48] were captured by Aucher [2] and van Ditmarsch [23] using logical operators B n a P. Intuitively, 0-belief B 0 a P is the same as simple belief B a P; 1-belief B 1 a P means that P is believed conditional on learning that not all the 0-beliefs are true etc. Formally, this can be introduced e.g, by defining by induction a sequence of appearance maps s s |= B n a P iff t |= P for all t ∈ s n a . A state s has degree of belief n if we have s ∈ s n a . An interesting observation is that the finite degrees of belief B n a P can be defined using the unary revision operator * a P and the knowledge operator K a (and, as a consequence, they can be defined using the plausibility operator [> a ]P and the knowledge operator). To do this, first put inductively: "Strong Belief". Another important doxastic attitude can be defined in terms of knowledge and safe belief as:
In terms of the plausibility order, it means that all the P-states in the information cell s(a) of s are bellow (more plausible than) all the non-P states in s(a) (and that, moreover, there are such P-states in s(a)). This notion is called "strong belief" by Battigalli and Siniscalchi [13] , while Stalnaker [50] calls it "robust belief". Another characterization of strong belief is the following s |= SbaQ iff: s |= BaQ and s |= B P a Q for every P such that s |= ¬Ka(P → ¬Q)
In other words: something is strong belief if it is believed and if this belief can only be defeated by evidence (truthful or not) that is known to contradict it. An example is the "presumption of innocence" in a trial: requiring the members of the jury to hold the accused as "innocent until proven guilty" means asking them to start the trial with a "strong belief" in innocence.
The Logic of Conditional Beliefs
The logic CDL ("conditional doxastic logic") introduced in [8] is a logic of conditional beliefs, equivalent to the strongest logic considered in [19] . The syntax of CDL (without common knowledge and common belief operators 13 ) is:
a ϕ while the semantics is given by an interpretation map associating to each sentence ϕ of CDL a doxastic proposition ϕ . The definition is by induction, in terms of the obvious compositional clauses (using the doxastic operators B P a Q defined above). In this logic, knowledge and simple (unconditional) belief are derived operators, defined as abbreviations by putting K a ϕ := B ¬ϕ a ϕ, B a ϕ := B a ϕ (where := ¬(p ∧ ¬p) is some tautological sentence).
Proof System. In addition to the rules and axioms of propositional logic, the proof system of CDL includes the following: ϑ ↔ B ϕ a (ψ → ϑ)) Proposition 2.4 (Completeness and Decidability). The above system is complete for MPMs (and so also for EPMs). Moreover, it is decidable and has the finite model property.
Proof. The proof is essentially the same as in [19] . It is easy to see that the proof system above is equivalent to Board's strongest logic in [19] (the one that includes axiom for full introspection), and that our models are equivalent to the "full introspective" version of the semantics in [19] . q.e.d.
The Logic of Knowledge and Safe Belief
The problem of finding a complete axiomatization of the logic of "defeasible knowledge" (safe belief) and conditional belief was posed as an open question in [19] . We answer this question here, by extending the logic CDL above to a complete logic K2 of knowledge and safe belief. Since this logic can define conditional belief, it is in fact equivalent to the logic whose axiomatization was required in [19] . Solving the question posed there becomes in fact trivial, once we observe that the higher-order definition of "defeasible knowledge" in [51, 19] (corresponding to our identity (1.3) above) is in fact equivalent to our simpler, first-order definition of "safe belief" as a Kripke modality.
Syntax and Semantics. The syntax of the logic K2 is:
while the semantics over plausibility models is given as for CDL, by inductively defining an interpretation map from sentences to doxastic propositions, using the obvious compositional clauses. Belief and conditional belief are derived operators here, defined as abbreviations:
whereK a ϕ := ¬K a ¬ϕ is the Diamond modality for K, and = ¬(p∧¬p) is some tautological sentence. So the logic K2 is more expressive than CDL.
Proof System. In addition to the rules and axioms of propositional logic, the proof system for the logic K2 includes the following:
• the Necessitation Rules for both K a and 2 a ;
• the S5-axioms for K a ;
• the S4-axioms for 2 a ;
• K a P → 2 a P ;
Theorem 2.5 (Completeness and Decidability). The logic K2 is (weakly) complete with respect to MPMs (and so also with respect to EPMs). Moreover, it is decidable and has the finite model property.
Proof. A non-standard frame (model) is a structure (S, ≥ a , ∼ a ) a (together with a valuation, in the case of models) such that ∼ a are equivalence relations, ≥ a are preorders, ≥ a ⊆∼ a and the restriction of ≥ a to each ∼ aequivalence class is connected. For a logic with two modalities, 2 a for ≥ a and K a for the relation ∼ a , we can use well-known results in Modal Correspondence Theory to see that each of these semantic conditions corresponds to one of our modal axioms above. By general classical results on canonicity and modal correspondence 14 , we immediately obtain completeness for non-standard models. Finite model property for these non-standard models follows from the same general results. But every finite strict preorder relation > is well-founded, and an MPM is nothing but a non-standard model whose strict preorders > a are well-founded. So completeness for ("standard") MPMs immediately follows. Then we can use Proposition 2.4 above to obtain completeness for EPMs. Finally, decidability follows, in the usual way, from finite model property together with completeness (with respect to a finitary proof system) and with the decidability of model-checking on finite models. (This last property is obvious, given the semantics.)
q.e.d.
"Dynamic" Belief Revision
The revision captured by conditional beliefs is of a static, purely hypothetical, nature. We cannot interpret B ϕ a as referring to the agent's revised beliefs about the situation after revision; if we did, then the "Success" axiom B ϕ a ϕ would fail for higher-level beliefs. To see this, consider a "Moore sentence" ϕ := p ∧ ¬B a p , 14 See e.g. [18] for the general theory of modal correspondence and canonicity.
saying that some fact p holds but that agent a doesn't believe it. The sentence ϕ is consistent, so it may very well happen to be true. But agent a's beliefs about the situation after learning that ϕ was true cannot possibly include the sentence ϕ itself: after learning this sentence, agent a knows p, and so he believes p, contrary to what ϕ asserts. Thus, after learning ϕ, agent a knows that ϕ is false now (after the learning). This directly contradicts the Success axiom: far from believing the sentence after learning it to be true, the agent (knows, and so he correctly) believes that it has become false. There is nothing paradoxical about this: sentences may obviously change their truth values, due to our actions. Since learning the truth of a sentence is itself an action, it is perfectly consistent to have a case in which learning changes the truth value of the very sentence that is being learnt. Indeed, this is always the case with Moore sentences. Though not paradoxical, the existence of Moore sentences shows that the "Success" axiom does not correctly describe a rational agent's (higher-level) beliefs about what is the case after a new truth is being learnt.
The only way to understand the "Success" axiom in the context of higher-level beliefs is to insist on the above-mentioned "static" interpretation of conditional belief operators B ϕ a , as expressing the agent's revised belief about how the state of the world was before the revision.
In contrast, a belief update is a dynamic form of belief revision, meant to capture the actual change of beliefs induced by learning: the updated belief is about the state of the world as it is after the update. As noticed in [28, 6, 5] , the original model does not usually include enough states to capture all the epistemic possibilities that arise in this way. While in the previous section the models were kept unchanged during the revision, all the possibilities being already there (so that both the unconditional and the conditional beliefs referred to the same model ), we now have to allow for belief updates that change the original model.
In [5] , it was argued that epistemic events should be modeled in essentially the same way as epistemic states, and this common setting was taken to be given by epistemic Kripke models. Since in this paper we enriched our state models with doxastic plausibility relations to deal with (conditional) beliefs, it is natural to follow [5] into extending the similarity between actions and states to this setting, thus obtaining (epistemic) action plausibility models. The idea of such an extension was first developed in [2] (for a different notion of plausibility model and a different notion of update product), then generalized in [23] , where many types of action plausibility models and notions of update product, that extend the so-called BMS update product from [6, 5] , are explored. But both these works are based on a quantitative interpretation of plausibility ordinals (as "degrees of belief"), and thus they define the various types of products using complex formulas of transfinite ordinal arithmetic, for which no intuitive justification is provided.
In contrast, our notion of update product is a purely qualitative one, based on a simple and intuitive relational definition: the simplest way to define a total pre-order on a Cartesian product, given total pre-orders on each of the components, is to use either the lexicographic or the anti-lexicographic order. We choose the second option, as the closest in spirit to the classical AGM theory: it gives priority to the new, incoming information (i.e. to "actions" in our sense). 15 We justify this choice by interpreting the action plausibility model as representing the agent's "incoming" belief, i.e. the belief-updating event, which "performs" the update, by "acting" on the "prior" beliefs (as given in the state plausibility model).
Action Models
An action plausibility model 16 (APM, for short) is a plausibility frame (Σ, ≤ a ) a∈A together with a precondition map pre : Σ → Prop, associating to each element of Σ some doxastic proposition pre σ . We call the elements of Σ (basic) doxastic actions (or "events"), and we call pre σ the precondition of action σ. The basic actions σ ∈ Σ are taken to represent deterministic belief-revising actions of a particularly simple nature. Intuitively, the precondition defines the domain of applicability of action σ: it can be executed on a state s iff s satisfies its precondition. The relations ≤ a give the agents' beliefs about which actions are more plausible than others.
To model non-determinism, we introduce the notion of epistemic program. A doxastic program over a given action model Σ (or Σ-program, for short) is simply a set Γ ⊆ Σ of doxastic actions. We can think of doxastic programs as non-deterministic actions: each of the basic actions γ ∈ Γ is a possible "deterministic resolution" of Γ. For simplicity, when Γ = {γ} is a singleton, we ambiguously identify the program Γ with the action γ.
Observe that Σ-programs Γ ⊆ Σ are formally the "dynamic analogues" of S-propositions P ⊆ S. So the dynamic analogue of the conditional doxastic appearance s P a (representing agent a's revised theory about state s, after revision with proposition P ) is the set σ Γ a .
Interpretation: Beliefs about Changes Encode Changes of Beliefs.
The name "doxastic actions" might be a bit misleading, and from a philosophical perspective Johan van Benthem's term "doxastic events" seems more appropriate. The elements of a plausibility model do not carry information about agency or intentionality and cannot represent "real" actions in all their complexity, but only the doxastic changes induced by these actions: each of the nodes of the graph represents a specific kind of change of beliefs (of all the agents). As in [5] , we only deal here with pure "belief changes", i.e. actions that do not change the "ontic" facts of the world, but only the agents' beliefs 17 . Moreover, we think of these as deterministic changes: there is at most one output of applying an action to a state. 18 Intuitively, the precondition defines the domain of applicability of σ: this action can be executed on a state s iff s satisfies its precondition. The plausibility pre-orderings ≤ a give the agent' conditional beliefs about the current action. But this should be interpreted as beliefs about changes, that encode changes of beliefs. In this sense, we use such "beliefs about actions" as a way to represent doxastic changes: the information about how the agent changes her beliefs is captured by our action plausibility relations. So we read σ < a σ as saying that: if agent a is informed that either σ or σ is currently happening, then she cannot distinguish between the two, but she believes that σ is in fact happening. As already mentioned, doxastic programs Γ ⊆ Σ represent non-deterministic changes of belief. Finally, for an action σ and a program Γ, the program σ Γ a represents the agent's revised theory (belief ) about the current action σ after "learning" that (one of the deterministic resolutions γ in) Γ is currently happening.
Example 3.1 (Private "Fair-Game" Announcements). Let us consider the action that produced the situation represented in Example 2.2 above. In front of Alice, Bob looked at the coin, in such a way that (it was common knowledge that) only he saw the face. In the DEL literature, this is sometimes known as a "fair game" announcement: everybody is commonly aware that an insider (or a group of insiders) privately learns some information. It is "fair" since the outsiders are not "deceived" in any way: e.g. in our example, Alice knows that Bob looks at the coin (and he knows that she knows etc.). In other words, Bob's looking at the coin is not an "illegal" action, but one that obeys the (commonly agreed) "rules of the game". To make this precise, let us assume that this is happening in such a way that Alice has no strong beliefs about which of the two possible actions (Bobseeing-Heads-up and Bob-seeing-Tails-up) is actually happening. Of course, we assumed that before this, she already believed that the coin lies Heads up, but apart from this we now assume that the way the action (of "Bob looking") is happening gives her no indication of what face he is seeing. We represent these actions using a two-node plausibility model Σ 2 (where as in the case of state models we draw arrows for the converse plausibility relations ≥ a , disregarding all the loops):
Example 3.2. Fully Private Announcements] Let us consider the action that produced the situation represented in Example 2.3 above. This was the action of Bob taking a peek at the coin, while Alice was away. Recall that we assumed that Alice believed that nothing was really happening in her absence (since she assumed Bob was playing by the rules), though obviously she didn't know this (that nothing was happening). In the DEL literature, this action is usually called a fully private announcement: Bob learns which face is up, while the outsider Alice believes nothing of the kind is happening. To represent this, we consider an action model Σ 3 consisting of three "actions": the actual action σ in which Bob takes a peek and sees the coin lying Heads up; the alternative possible action ρ is the one in which Bob sees the coin lying Tails up; finally, the action τ is the one in which "nothing is really happening" (as Alice believes). The plausibility model Σ 3 for this action is:
Here, the action σ is the one in the upper left corner, having precondition H: indeed, this can happen iff the coin is really lying Heads up; similarly, the action ρ in the upper right corner has precondition T, since it can only happen iff the coin is Tails up. Finally, the action τ is the lower one, having as precondition the "universally true" proposition : indeed, this action can always happen (since in it, nothing is really happening!). The plausibility relations reflect the agents' beliefs: in each case, both Bob and Charles know exactly what is happening, so their local plausibility relations are the identity (and thus we draw no arrows for them). Alice believes nothing is happening, so τ is the most plausible action for her (to which all her arrows are pointing); so she keeps her belief that H is the case, thus considering σ as more plausible than ρ.
Examples of Doxastic Programs. Consider the program Γ = {σ, ρ} ⊆ Σ 3 over the action model Σ 3 from Example 3.2. The program Γ represents the action of "Bob taking a peek at the coin", without any specification of which face he is seeing. Although expressed in a non-deterministic manner (as a collection of two possible actions, σ and ρ), this program corresponds is in fact deterministic, since in each possible state only one of the actions σ or ρ can happen: there is no state satisfying both H and T. The whole set Σ gives another doxastic program, one that is really non-deterministic:
it represents the non-deterministic choice of Bob between taking a peek and not taking it.
Appearance of Actions and Their Revision: Examples. As an example of an agent's "theory" about an action, consider the appearance of action ρ to Alice: ρ a = {τ }. Indeed, if ρ happens (Bob taking a peek and sees the coin is Tails up), Alice believes that τ (i.e. nothing) is happening: this is the "apparent action", as far as Alice is concerned. As an example of a "revised theory" about an action, consider the conditional appearance ρ Γ a of ρ to Alice given the program Γ = {σ, ρ} introduced above. It is easy to see that we have ρ Γ a = {σ}. This captures our intuitions about Alice's revised theory: if, while ρ was happening, she were told that Bob took a peek (i.e. she'd revise with Γ), then she would believe that he saw the coin lying Heads up (i.e. that σ happened).
Example 3.3 (Successful Lying). Suppose now that, after the previous action, i.e. after we arrived in the situation described in Example 2.3, Bob sneakily announces: "I took a peek and saw the coin was lying Tails up". We formalize the content of this announcement as K b T, i.e. saying that "Bob knows the coin is lying Tails up". This is a public announcement, but not a truthful one (though it does convey some truthful information): it is a lie! We assume it is in fact a successful lie: it is common knowledge that, even after Bob admitted having taken a peek, Alice still believes him. This action is given by the left node in the following model Σ 4 :
The Action-Priority Update
We are ready to define our update operation, representing the way an action from a (action) plausibility model Σ = (Σ, ≤ a , pre) a∈A "acts" on an inputstate from a given (state) plausibility model S = (S, ≤ a , · ) a∈A . We denote the updated state model by S ⊗ Σ, and call it the update product of the two models. The construction is similar to a point to the one in [6, 5] , and thus also somewhat similar to the ones in [2, 23] . In fact, the set of updated states, the updated valuation and the updated indistinguishability relation are the same in these constructions. The main difference lies in our definition of the updated plausibility relation, via the Action Priority Rule.
3.2.1 Updating single-agent models: the anti-lexicographic order. To warm up, let us first define the update product for the single-agent case. Let S = (S, ≤, · ) be a single-agent plausibility state model and let Σ = (Σ, ≤, pre) be a single-agent plausibility action model.
We represent the states of the updated model S ⊗ Σ as pairs (s, σ) of input-states and actions, i.e. as elements of the Cartesian product S × Σ. This reflects that the basic actions in our action models are assumed to be deterministic: for a given input-state and a given action, there can only be at most one output-state. More specifically, we select the pairs which are consistent, in the sense that the input-state satisfies the precondition of the action. This is natural: the precondition of an action is a specification of its domain of applicability. So the set of states of S ⊗ Σ is taken to be
The updated valuation is essentially given by the original valuation from the input-state model: for all (s, σ) ∈ S ⊗ Σ, we put (s, σ) |= p iff s |= p. This "conservative" way to update the valuation expresses the fact that we only consider here actions that are "purely doxastic", i.e. pure "belief changes", that do not affect the ontic "facts" of the world (captured here by atomic sentences).
We still need to define the updated plausibility relation. To motivate our definition, we first consider two examples: Example 3.4 (A Sample Case). Suppose that we have two states s, s ∈ S such that s < s , s |= ¬P, s |= P. This means that, if given the supplementary information that the real state is either s or s , the agent believes ¬P:
Suppose then an event happens, in whose model there are two actions σ, σ such that σ > σ , pre σ = ¬P, pre σ = P. In other words, if given the information that either σ or σ is happening, the agent believes that σ is happening, i.e. she believes that P is learnt. This part of the model behaves just like a soft public announcement of P:
• Naturally, we expect the agent to change change her belief accordingly, i.e. her updated plausibility relation on states should now go the other way:
• Example 3.5 (A Second Sample Case). Suppose the initial situation was the same as above, but now the two actions σ, σ are assumed to be equiplausible: σ ∼ = σ . This is a completely unreliable announcement of P, in which the veracity and the falsity of the announcement are equally plausible alternatives:
In the AGM paradigm, it is natural to expect the agents to keep their original beliefs unchanged after this event:
The Anti-lexicographic Order. Putting the above two sample cases together, we conclude that the updated plausibility relation should be the anti-lexicographic preorder relation induced on pairs (s, σ) ∈ S × Σ by the preorders on S and on Σ, i.e.:
(s, σ) ≤ (s , σ ) iff: either σ < σ , or else σ ∼ = σ and s ≤ s .
In other words, the updated plausibility order gives "priority" to the action plausibility relation, and apart from this it keeps as much as possible the old order. This reflects our commitment to an AGM-type of revision, in which the new information has priority over old beliefs. The "actions" represent here the "new information", although (unlike in AGM) this information comes in dynamic form (as action plausibility order), and so it is not fully reducible to its propositional content (the action's precondition). In fact, this is a generalization of one of the belief-revision policies encountered in the literature (the so-called "maximal-Spohn revision"). But, in the context of our qualitative (conditional) interpretation of plausibility models, we will argue below that this is essentially the only reasonable option.
Updating multi-agent models: the general case
In the multi-agent case, the construction of the updated state space and updated valuation is the same as above. But for the updated plausibility relation we need to take into account a third possibility: the case when either the initial states or the actions are distinguishable, belonging to different information cells. Example 3.6 (A Third Sample Case). Suppose that we have two states s, s ∈ S such that s |= ¬P, s |= P, but s ∼ a s are distinguishable (i.e. non-comparable):
This means that, if given the supplementary information that the real state is either s or s , the agent immediately knows which of the two is the real states, and thus she knows whether P holds or not. It is obvious that, after any of the actions considered in the previous two examples, a perfect-recall agent will continue to know whether P held or not, and so the output-states after σ and σ will still be distinguishable (non-comparable).
The "Action-Priority" Rule. Putting this together with the other sample cases, we obtain our update rule, in full generality:
(s, σ) ≤ a (s , σ ) iff either σ < a σ and s ∼ a s , or else σ ∼ =a σ and s ≤ a s
We regard this construction as the most natural analogue in a beliefrevision context of the similar notion in [5, 6] . Following a suggestion of Johan van Benthem, we call this the Action-Priority Update Rule.
Sanity Check: Examples 2.2 and 2.3 Revisited. To check the correctness of our update operation, take first the update product S ⊗ Σ 2 of the model S in Example 2.1 from the previous section with the action model Σ 2 in Example 3.1 from the previous section. As predicted, the resulting state model is isomorphic to the model W from Example 2.2. Similarly, if Σ 3 is the action model from Example 3.2, then we can see that the product S ⊗ Σ 3 is isomorphic to the state model S from Example 2.3.
"In-sanity Check": Successful Lying. Applying the action model Σ 4 in Example 3.3, representing the "successful lying" action, to the state model S from Example 2.3, we obtain indeed the intuitively correct output of "successful lying", namely the following model S ⊗ Σ 4 :
Interpretation. As its name makes explicit, the Action-Priority Rule gives "priority" to the action plausibility relation. This is not an arbitrary choice, but it is motivated by our specific interpretation of action models, as embodied in our Motto above: beliefs about changes (i.e. the action plausibility relations) are nothing but ways to encode changes of belief (i.e. reversals of the original plausibility order). So the (strict) order on actions encodes changes of order on states. The Action-Priority Rule is a consequence of this interpretation: it just says that a strong plausibility order σ < a σ on actions corresponds indeed to a change of ordering, (from whatever the ordering was) between the original (indistinguishable) input-states s ∼ a s , to the order (s, σ) < a (s , σ ) between output-states; while equally plausible actions σ ∼ =a σ will leave the initial ordering unchanged: (s, σ) ≤ a (s , σ ) iff s ≤ a s . Giving priority to action plausibility does not in any way mean that the agent's belief in actions is stronger than her belief in states; it just captures the fact that, at the time of updating with a given action, the belief about the action is what is actual, it is the current belief about what is going on, while the beliefs about the input-states are in the past.
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In a nutshell: the doxastic action is the one that changes the initial doxastic state, and not vice-versa. The belief update induced by a given action is nothing but an update with the (presently) believed action. If the believed action σ requires the agent to revise some past beliefs, then so be it: this is the whole point of believing σ, namely to use it to revise one's past beliefs. For example, in a successful lying, the action plausibility relation makes the hearer believe that the speaker is telling the truth; so she'll accept this message (unless contradicted by her knowledge), and change her past beliefs appropriately: this is what makes the lying successful.
Action-Priority Update Generalizes Product Update. Recall the definition of the epistemic indistinguishability relation ∼ a in a plausibility model: s ∼ a s iff either s ≤ a s or s ≤ a s. It is easy to see that the Action Priority Update implies the familiar update rule from [6, 5] , known in Dynamic Epistemic Logic as the "product update":
Program Transitions. For every state model S, every program Γ ⊆ Σ over an action model Σ induces a transition relation
Simulating Various Belief-Revision Policies
We give here three examples of multi-agent belief-revision policies that can be simulated by our product update: truthful public announcements of "hard facts", "lexicographic update" and "conservative upgrade". They were all introduced by van Benthem in [14] , as multi-agent versions of revision operators previously considered by Rott [44] and others.
Public Announcements of "Hard Facts". A truthful public announcement ! P of some "hard fact" P is not really about belief revision, but about the learning of certified true information: it establishes common knowledge that P was the case. This is the action described in [14] as (public) "belief change under hard facts". As an operation on models, this is described in [14] as taking any state model S and deleting all the non-P states, while keeping the same indistinguishability and plausibility relations between the surviving states. In our setting, the corresponding action model consists of only one node, labeled with P. It is easy to see that the above operation on models can be exactly "simulated" by taking the anti-lexicographic product update with this one-node action model. Public Announcements of "Soft Facts": The "Lexicographic Upgrade". To allow for "soft" belief revision, an operation ⇑P was introduced in [14] , essentially adapting to public announcements the 'lexicographic' policy for belief revision described in [44] . This operation, called "lexicographic update" consists of changing the current plausibility order on any given state model as follows: all P-worlds become more plausible than all ¬P-worlds, and within the two zones, the old ordering remains. In our setting, this action corresponds to the following local plausibility action model:
Taking the anti-lexicographic update product with this action will give an exact "simulation" of the lexicographic upgrade operation.
"Conservative Upgrade". The operation ↑P of "conservative upgrade", also defined in [14] , changes any model as follows: the best P-worlds come on top (i.e. the most plausible P-states become the most plausible overall), and apart from that, the old order remains. In the case of a system with only one agent, it is easy to see that we have ↑P = ⇑( * a P), where * a is the unary "revision modality" introduced in the previous section. In the case of a set A = {1, · · · , n} with n > 1 agents, we can simulate ↑P using a model with 2 n actions {↑ I P} I⊆A , with
Operations on doxastic programs
First, we introduce dynamic modalities, capturing the "weakest precondition" of a program Γ. These are the natural analogues of the PDL modalities for our program transition relations Γ → between models.
Dynamic Modalities. Let Σ be some action plausibility model and Γ ⊆ Σ be a doxastic model over Σ. For every doxastic proposition P, we define a doxastic proposition [Γ]P given by
For basic doxastic actions σ ∈ Σ, we define the dynamic modality [σ] via the above-mentioned identification of actions σ with singleton programs {σ}:
The dual (Diamond) modalities are defined as usually:
We can now introduce operators on doxastic programs that are the analogues of the regular operations of PDL.
Sequential Composition. The sequential composition Σ; ∆ of two action plausibility models Σ = (Σ, ≤ a , pre), ∆ = (∆, ≤ a , pre) is defined as follows:
• the set of basic actions is the Cartesian product Σ × ∆
• the preconditions are given by pre (σ,δ) := σ pre δ
• the plausibility order is given by putting (σ, δ) ≤ a (σ , δ ) iff:
either σ ≤ a σ and δ ∼ a δ , or else σ ∼ =a σ and δ ≤ a δ .
We think of (σ, δ) as the action of performing first σ then δ, and thus use the notation σ; δ := (σ, δ).
We can extend this notation to doxastic programs, by defining the sequential composition of programs Γ ⊆ Σ and Λ ⊆ ∆ to be a program Γ; Λ ⊆ Σ; ∆ over the action model Σ; ∆, given by:
It is easy to see that this behaves indeed like a sequential composition:
For every state plausibility model S, action plausibility models Σ and ∆, and programs Γ ⊆ Σ, Λ ⊆ ∆, we have the following:
1. The state plausibility models (S ⊗ Σ) ⊗ ∆ and S ⊗ (Σ; ∆) are isomorphic, via the canonical map F : (S ⊗ Σ) ⊗ ∆ → S ⊗ (Σ; ∆) given by F ( ((s, σ), δ) ) := (s, (σ, δ)).
2. The transition relation for the program Γ; ∆ is the relational composition of the transition relations for Γ and for ∆ and of the isomorphism map F :
Union (Non-deterministic Choice). If Σ = (Σ, ≤ a , pre) and ∆ = (∆, ≤ a , pre ) are two action plausibility models, their disjoint union Σ ∆ is simply given by taking as set of states the disjoint union Σ ∆ of the two sets of states, taking as plausibility order the disjoint union ≤ a ≤ a and as precondition map the disjoint union pre pre of the two precondition maps. If Γ ⊆ Σ and Λ ⊆ ∆ are doxastic programs over the two models, we define their union to be the program over the model Σ ∆ given by the disjoint union Γ Λ of the the sets of actions of the two programs.
Again, it is easy to see that this behaves indeed like a non-deterministic choice operator : 
The Laws of Dynamic Belief Revision
The "laws of dynamic belief revision" are the fundamental equations of Belief Dynamics, allowing us to compute future doxastic attitudes from past ones, given the doxastic events that happen in the meantime. In modal terms, these can be stated as "reduction laws" for inductively computing dynamic modalities [Γ]P, by reducing them to modalities [Γ ]P in which either the propositions P or the programs Γ have lower complexity.
The following immediate consequence of the definition of [Γ]P allows us to reduce modalities for non-deterministic programs Γ to the ones for their deterministic resolutions γ ∈ Γ:
Deterministic Resolution Law. For every program Γ ⊆ Σ, we have
So, for our other laws, we can restrict ourselves to basic actions in Σ.
The Action-Knowledge Law. For every action σ ∈ Σ, we have:
This Action-Knowledge Law is essentially the same as in [6, 5] : a proposition P will be known after a doxastic event iff, whenever the event can take place, it is known that P will become true after all events that are indistinguishable from the given one.
The Action-Safe-Belief Law. For every action σ ∈ Σ, we have:
This law embodies the essence of the Action-Priority Rule: a proposition P will be safely believed after a doxastic event iff, whenever the event can take place, it is known that P will become true after all more plausible events and in the same time it is safely believed that P will become true after all equi-plausible events.
Since we took knowledge and safe belief as the basis of our static logic K2, the above two laws are the "fundamental equations" of our theory of dynamic belief revision. But note that, as a consequence, one can obtain derived laws for (conditional) belief as well. Indeed, using the above-mentioned characterization of conditional belief in terms of K and 2, we obtain the following:
The Derived Law of Action-Conditional-Belief. For every action σ ∈ Σ, we have:
This derived law, a version of which was first introduced in [10] (where it was considered a fundamental law), allows us to predict future conditional beliefs from current conditional beliefs.
To explain the meaning of this law, we re-state it as follows: for every s ∈ S and σ ∈ Σ, we have:
It is easy to see that this "local" (state-dependent) version of the reduction law is equivalent to the previous (state-independent) one. The set Γ encodes the extra information about the current action that is given to the agent by the context s and by the post-condition P; while σ Γ a is the action's post-conditional contextual appearance, i.e. the way it appears to the agent in the view of this extra-information Γ. Indeed, a given action might "appear" differently in a given context (i.e. at a state s) than it does in general: the information possessed by the agent at the state s might imply the negation of certain actions, hence their impossibility; this information will then be used to revise the agent's beliefs about the actions, obtaining her contextual beliefs. Moreover, in the presence of further information (a "post-condition" P), this appearance might again be revised. The "postconditional contextual appearance" is the result of this double revision: the agent's belief about action σ is revised with the information given to her by the context s and the post-condition P. This information is encoded in a set Γ = {γ ∈ Σ : s |= SKa γ P} of "admissible" actions: the actions for which the agent considers epistemically possible (at s) that they can be performed and they can achieve the post-condition P. The "post-conditional contextual appearance" σ Γ a of action σ captures the agent's revised theory about σ after revision with the relevant information Γ .
So the above law says that: the agent's future conditional beliefs [σ]B P a can be predicted, given that action σ happens, by her current conditional beliefs
] about what will be true after the apparent action σ Γ a (as it appears in the given context and in the view of the given post-condition P), beliefs conditioned on the information ( σ Γ a P) that the apparent action σ Γ a actually can lead to the fulfilment of the post-condition P. Special Cases. As special cases of the Action-Conditional-Belief Law, we can derive all the reduction laws in [14] for (conditional) belief after the events ! P, ⇑P and ↑P: Laws for Other Doxastic Attitudes. The equi-plausibility modality behaves dynamically "almost" like knowledge, while the strict plausibility modality behaves like safe belief, as witnessed by the following laws:
From these, we can derive laws for all the other doxastic attitudes above.
The logic of doxastic actions
The problem of finding a general syntax for action models has been tackled in various ways by different authors. Here we use the action-signature approach from [5] .
Signature. A doxastic action signature is a finite plausibility frame Σ, together with an ordered list without repetitions (σ 1 , . . . , σ n ) of some of the elements of Σ. The elements of Σ are called action types. A type σ is called trivial if it is not in the above list.
Example 3.9. The "hard" public announcement signature HardPub is a singleton frame, consisting of one action type !, identity as the order relation, and the list (!). The "soft" public announcement signature SoftPub is a two-point frame, consisting of types ⇑ and ⇓, with ⇓ < a ⇑ for all agents a, and the list (⇑, ⇓).
Similarly, one can define the signatures of fully private announcements with n alternatives, private "fair-game" announcements, conservative upgrades etc. As we will see below, there is no signature of "successful (public) lying": public lying actions fall under the type of "soft" public announcements, so they are generated by that signature.
Languages. For each action signature (Σ, (σ 1 , . . . , σ n )), the language L(Σ) consists of a set of sentences ϕ and a set of program terms π, defined by simultaneous recursion:
where p ∈ Φ, a ∈ A, σ ∈ Σ, and σϕ 1 . . . ϕ n is an expression consisting of σ and a string of n sentences, where n is the length of the list (σ 1 , . . . , σ n ).
Syntactic Action Model. The expressions of the form σ ϕ are called basic programs. The preorders on Σ induce in a natural way preorders on the basic programs in L(Σ): σ ϕ ≤ a σ ψ iff σ ≤ a σ and ϕ = ψ.
The given listing can be used to assign syntactic preconditions for basic programs, by putting: pre σi ϕ := ϕ i , and pre σ ϕ := (the trivially true sentence) if σ is not in the listing. Thus, the basic programs of the form σ ϕ form a "syntactic plausibility model" Σ ϕ; i.e. every given interpretation · : L(Σ) → Prop of sentences as doxastic propositions will convert this syntactic model into a "real" (semantic) plausibility model, called Σ ϕ .
Action Models Induced by a Signature. For a given signature Σ, let (σ 1 , . . . , σ n ) be its list of non-trivial types, and let P = (P 1 , . . . , P n ) be a matching list of doxastic propositions. The action model generated by the signature Σ and the list of propositions P is the model Σ P, having Σ as its underlying action frame and having a precondition map given by: pre σi = P i , for non-trivial types σ i ; and pre σ = (the trivially true proposition), for trivial types σ. When referring to σ as an action in Σ P, we will denote it by σ P, to distinguish it from the action type σ ∈ Σ.
We can obviously extend this construction to sets of action types: given a signature Σ and a list P = (P 1 , . . . , P n ), every set Γ ⊆ Σ gives rise to a doxastic program Γ P := {σ P : σ ∈ Σ} ⊆ Σ P. Example 3.10. The action model of a hard public announcement ! P is generated as !(P) by the hard public announcement signature HardPub = {!} and the list (P). Similarly, the action model SoftPub(P) generated by the soft public announcement signature SoftPub and a list (P, Q) of two propositions consists of two actions ⇑(P, Q) and ⇓(P, Q), with ⇑(P, Q) < a ⇓(P, Q), pre ⇑(P,Q) = P and pre ⇓(P,Q) = Q:
This represents an event during which all agents share a common belief that P is announced; but they might be wrong and maybe Q was announced instead. However, it is common knowledge that either P or Q was announced.
Successful (public) lying LieP (by an anonymous agent, falsely announcing P) can now be expressed as LieP := ⇓(P, ¬P). The truthful soft announcement is T rueP := ⇑(P, ¬P). Finally, the soft public announcement (lexicographic update) ⇑P, as previously defined, is given by the nondeterministic union ⇑P := T rueP LieP.
Semantics. We define by simultaneous induction two interpretation maps, one taking sentences ϕ into doxastic propositions ϕ ∈ Prop, the second taking program terms π into doxastic programs π over some plausibility frames. The inductive definition uses the obvious semantic clauses. For programs: σ ϕ is the action σ ϕ (or, more exactly, the singleton program {σ ϕ } over the frame Σ ϕ ), π π := π π , π; π := π ; π . For sentences: p is as given by the valuation, ¬ϕ := ¬ ϕ , ϕ ∧ ψ := ϕ ∧ ψ , K a ϕ := K a ϕ , 2 a ϕ := 2 a ϕ , [π]ϕ := [ π ] ϕ .
Proof System. In addition to the axioms and rules of the logic K2, the logic L(Σ) includes the following Reduction Axioms:
where p is any atomic sentence, π, π are program terms, α is a basic program term in L(Σ), pre is the syntactic precondition map defined above, and ∼ a , < a , ∼ =a are respectively the (syntactic) epistemic indistinguishability, the strict plausibility order and the equi-plausibility relation on basic programs.
Theorem 3.11. For every signature Σ, the above proof system for the dynamic logic L(Σ) is complete, decidable and has the finite model property.
In fact, this dynamic logic has the same expressive power as the "static" logic K2 of knowledge and safe belief.
Proof(sketch). The proof is similar to the ones in [5, 6, 24] . We use the reduction laws to inductively simplify any formula until it is reduced to a formula of the K2-logic, then use the completeness of the K2 logic. Note that this is not an induction on subformulas, but (as in [6] ) on an appropriate notion of "complexity" ordering of formulas.
Current and Future Work. Some Open Questions
In our papers [11, 12] , we present a probabilistic version of the theory developed here, based on discrete (finite) Popper-Renyi conditional probability spaces (allowing for conditionalization on events of non-zero probability, in order to cope with non-trivial belief revisions). We consider subjective probability to be the proper notion of "degree of belief", and we investigate its relationship with the qualitative concepts developed here. We develop a probabilistic generalization of the Action Priority Rule, and show that the logics presented above are complete for the (discrete) conditional probabilistic semantics. what policies can be simulated by our update? (4) Extend the work in [11, 12] , by investigating and axiomatizing doxastic logics on infinite conditional probability models. (5) Extend the logics with quantitative (probabilistic) modal operators B P a,x Q (or 2 a,x Q) expressing that the degree of conditional belief in Q given P (or the degree of safety of the belief in Q) is at least x.
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